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Cedric Vanleenhove*
tHe Current euroPeAn PersPeCtIVe on 
tHe exequAtur oF u.s. PunItIVe DAMAGes: 
oPenInG tHe GAte But KeePInG A GuArD
Abstract:
Global trade and intercontinental tourism are on the rise in today’s world. This, in turn, 
leads to more cross-border law suits. Inevitably, jurisdictions will be confronted with legal 
concepts that are unknown in the host forum. This contribution investigates whether, and 
to what extent, punitive damages judgments originating in the United States can be en-
forced against the assets of a defendant in a number of selected Member States of the EU. 
More specifically, the article explores the possibilities of enforcing American punitive damages 
judgments in five EU countries, namely Germany, Italy, Spain, France and England. This 
comparative analysis reveals that the case law in these selected countries is relatively divergent 
as to the stance adopted towards foreign punitive damages, resulting in different degrees of 
acceptance of this legal remedy.
Keywords: european Union, punitive damages, United States 
IntroDuCtIon
The world we live in today is one where the practical significance of national bound-
aries is slowly eroding. Due to improved modes of transportation, people are able to 
visit other continents with relative ease. Similarly, with the rise of global commerce 
businesses are expanding into other jurisdictions. Distances are no longer a hindrance 
to global mobility. It could be said that the world is becoming a “global village”, not 
only on the level of electronic communication as once conceived by Professor Marshall 
McLuhan,1 but also in terms of tourism and trade. 
* Cedric vanleenhove, Ph.D., is Post-Doctoral researcher at the transnational Law Center of ghent 
University in Belgium. He is also Lecturer-in-Charge for a course in the first year of the Bachelor of Law 
program at ghent University. He holds an LL.M. in Commercial Law from Cambridge University (evan 
Lewis-Thomas Scholar of Sidney Sussex College) and was a visiting Fellow at Oxford University as well as 
a visiting researcher at Harvard Law School.
1 M. McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man, toronto University Press, to-
ronto: 1962, p. 31.
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This increased globalisation is arguably resulting, or will result, in an increased 
number of law suits between Common Law and Civil Law parties. In such transna- 
tional litigation it is inevitable that a domestic jurisdiction will at some point be faced 
with a legal institution that is alien to the substantive law of the forum state. Punitive 
damages are, alongside with, e.g., contingency fees, discovery procedures, and class ac-
tion lawsuits, such an institution. 
Common Law countries like the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and 
South Africa provide for punitive damages in their respective legal systems. These jurisdic-
tions may be called “dualistic” in that they make both punitive and compensatory dam-
ages available to litigants. Continental europe, on the other hand, is monistic in nature 
with respect to damages, since successful plaintiffs can only obtain compensatory dam-
ages and punitive damages are said to be non-existent. The concept of punitive damages 
is considered contrary to the fundamental separation of criminal and private (civil) law. 
Civil Law countries in the european Union are wary of punitive damages because they are 
administered in civil proceedings but pursue objectives which are traditionally the focus 
of criminal law. Punitive damages are also held to be anathema to the principle of strict 
compensation and are seen as resulting in an unjust enrichment of the plaintiff.
With the effects of punitive damages increasingly being felt outside the jurisdictions 
where they are awarded,2 and with punitive damages predicted to remain a significant 
feature of US litigation,3 european countries cannot ignore this important phenome-
non within American law.4 This contribution therefore investigates whether, and if so to 
what extent, American judgments for punitive damages will be enforced in five selected 
eU Member States. This private international law perspective is interesting, as private 
international law forms a country’s first line of defence against a remedy described 
as an “(undesired) peculiarity of American law”5 or even as “the trojan horse of the 
Americanisation of continental law” (own translation).6 A nation’s private international 
law attitude measures the country’s level of tolerance or receptiveness towards a foreign 
concept unknown in its own legal system. 
2 g. Nater-Bass, U.S.-Style Punitive Damages Awards and their Recognition and Enforcement in Switzerland 
and Other Civil-Law Countries, Deutsch-Amerikanische Juristen-vereinigung Newsletter (2003), p. 154.
3 K. Browne, Punitive Damages in the U.S.: A primer for insurance buyers and brokers, Armonk, Swiss 
re: 2011, p. 5, available at: http://www.thefederation.org/documents/06.Punitive_Damages_in_the_US-
Browne.pdf (accessed 20 April 2016).
4 t. rouhette, The Availability of Punitive Damages in Europe: Growing trend or nonexistent concept?, 
74(4) Defense Counsel Journal 320 (2007), p. 321.
5 e. de Kezel, The Protection and Enforcement of Private Interests by (the Recognition of US) Punitive Dam-
ages in Belgium, in: L. Meurkens, e. Nordin (eds.), The Power of Punitive Damages: Is Europe Missing Out?, 
Intersentia, Cambridge-Antwerp-Portland: 2012, p. 235.
6 y. Lambert-Faivre, S. Porchy-Simon, Droit du dommage corporel. Systèmes d’indemnisation, Dalloz, 
Paris: 2009, no. 92 and 375; H. Honsell, Amerikanische Rechtskultur, in: P. Forstmoser, H.S. von der 
Crone, r.H. Weber, D. Zobl (eds.), Festschrift für Roger Zäch zum 60. Geburtstag. Der Einfluss des europäi-
schen Rechts auf die Schweiz, Schulthess verlag, Zürich: 1999, p. 39; F.-X. Licari, La compatibilité de principe 
des punitive damages avec l’ordre public international. Une décision en trompe-l’œil de la Cour de cassation?, 
6 recueil Dalloz 423 (2011), p. 427.
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The choice for American punitive damages is prompted by three important con-
siderations. First, european national court decisions on private international law deal 
extensively with American punitive damages. The United States produces the most 
punitive damages judgments and its awards7 are in the highest amounts.8 A second 
factor is the particular position of the United States in the field of private interna-
tional law, which gives rise to some interesting issues. The United States (in con-
trast to Canada, New Zealand and Australia) is presently not a party to any bilateral 
treaty or multilateral international convention governing reciprocal recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments in europe. As a consequence, parties seeking rec-
ognition of an American judgment containing a punitive damages award are subject 
to a patchwork of national laws governing the recognition of judgments. Lastly, the 
european Union’s commerce is to a large extent focused on the United States. The 
USA is the leading country in the ranking of the european Union’s most important 
trading partners.9
This contribution discusses the chances for enforcement of US punitive damages 
in five eU countries: germany, Italy, Spain, France and england.10 The selection of 
these five Member States is inspired by two considerations. First, over 60 % of the eu-
ropean Union’s population lives on the territory of these five nations. Moreover, these 
countries represent the five largest economies of the european Union.11 Secondly, in 
an area of law where the available case law is limited, Italy, germany, France and 
Spain are particularly useful because the Supreme Courts of those countries have ruled 
on the issue of the enforceability of (American) punitive damages. Their approaches 
moreover represent the different poles of the spectrum. england is included because it 
is a Common Law country, and since english law provides for punitive damages,12 it 
is revealing to see the position of its own private international law doctrine on foreign 
punitive damages. 
7 In this contribution the term “award” will be not be used to refer to arbitral awards but rather to 
a portion of a court judgment. In particular, the terms “punitive award” and “award for punitive damages” 
refer to the heading of punitive damages within a foreign judgment. 
8 C.I. Nagy, Recognition and enforcement of US judgments involving punitive damages in continental 
Europe, 1 Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht 4 (2012).
9 european Commission, Directorate-general for trade, European Union, Trade in Goods with USA, 
16 April 2014, p. 2, available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113465.
pdf (accessed 20 April 2016).
10 european Union, EU member countries (4 November 2015), available at: http://europa.eu/about-
eu/countries/member-countries/index_en.htm (accessed 20 April 2016). In our contribution england is 
used instead of the United Kingdom.
11 The figures for the year 2013 are available on the website of the International Monetary Fund: 
International Monetary Fund, World Economic and Financial Surveys – World Economic Outlook Database 
(October 2013), available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/weodata/index.aspx (ac-
cessed 20 April 2016).
12 Rookes v. Barnard [1964], 1 All e.r. 367, 410-11 (H.L.) (punitive damages can be awarded in three 
categories of cases: abuses of power by government officials, torts committed for profit, or express statutory 
authorisation).
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In what follows, the concept of US punitive damages is first explained (part 1). 
Subsequently, the central mechanism at play when deciding on the enforcement of 
punitive damages – the (international) public policy exception – is elaborated in part 2. 
This paves the way for an analysis of how the traditional countries, germany and Italy, 
have rejected requests for enforcement of US punitive damages (part 3). Their approach 
stands in contrast to the attitude found in Spain and France, which have embraced the 
concept of punitive damages and have shifted to checking the possible excessiveness of 
a punitive damages award (part 4). In england, so-called “multiple damages”, i.e. puni-
tive damages arrived at by multiplying the amount of compensatory damages, stand 
no chance of penetrating the english borders, but the situation is less clear as to other 
forms of punitive damages (part 5). The main findings of the contribution are then 
summarised in the final part of the article.
1. tHe ConCePt oF PunItIVe DAMAGes In tHe us
Punitive damages are a typical and established feature of American law. In the 
United States, the Second restatement of torts and Black’s Law Dictionary define pu-
nitive damages as: “damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded 
against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others 
like him from similar conduct in the future.”13 The US Supreme Court views punitive 
damages as “private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and 
to deter its future occurrence.”14 The remedy can thus be described as an additional 
amount of money awarded to the victim of an unlawful act on top of the compensa-
tory damages award. As opposed to the latter, punitive damages do not (primarily) 
compensate for the harm suffered. Instead, they pursue the aims of punishment of the 
perpetrator and the deterrence of potential wrongdoers. The functions of punishment 
and deterrence are traditionally associated with criminal law sanctions. It is, therefore, 
often argued that punitive damages pursue criminal law objectives rather than private 
law ones.15 As a quasi-criminal institution, punitive damages are thus halfway between 
civil and criminal law and they call into question the boundary between these two 
spheres of law.16 
Punitive damages are an important tool in the United States’ societal model, which 
relies on private enforcement through tort litigation as a means to achieve public safety. 
13 Second restatement of torts § 908 (1979); B.A. garner (ed.), Black’s Law Dictionary (3rd ed.), West, 
St. Paul, Minnesota: 2006, p. 175.
14 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), 350.
15 L. Meurkens, The Punitive Damages Debate in Continental Europe: Food for thought, in: L. Meurkens, 
e. Nordin (eds.), The Power of Punitive Damages – Is Europe Missing Out?, Intersentia, Cambridge-Antwerp-
Portland: 2012, p. 4.
16 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 541; rouhette, supra note 4, p. 320; y. Adar, Touring the Punitive Dam-
ages Forest: A Proposed Roadmap, 2 Osservatorio del diritto civile e commerciale 275 (2012), p. 302.
Cedric Vanleenhove238
In this sense they act as a reward to incentivise private plaintiffs to seek redress for their 
own violated interests, thereby contributing to the common good.17 Punitive damages 
have always been a subject of political and academic debate.18 They are a much-dis-
cussed matter, similar to issues such as gun control or abortion.19 They are a controver-
sial feature of US law which adds to defendants’ perception of the American tort system 
as capricious, hostile and an avenue for “jackpot justice”.20 However, despite being 
considered an anomaly in the law of torts,21 punitive damages are an accepted form of 
penal remedy in American civil law.22 In Luther v. Shaw, for example, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court stated that: 
[t]he law giving exemplary damages is an outgrowth of the english love of liberty 
regulated by law (…) [that] (…) restrains the strong, influential, and unscrupulous, 
vindicates the right of the weak, and encourages recourse to and confidence in the courts 
of law by those wronged or oppressed by acts or practices not cognizable in or not 
sufficiently punished by the criminal law.23
Punitive damages most often arise under state tort law.24 each state of the US 
has a wide discretion with respect to the imposition of punitive damages. The fed-
eral system of the US has created considerable diversity among the 50 states as to 
the form and content of punitive damages.25 The US Constitution, however, can 
and has put significant limitations on the divergences between states.26 In addition 
to the various state laws, the federal level also provides in certain statutes for pu-
nitive damages. For instance, the Clayton Antitrust Act, the racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act (rICO), and the Comprehensive environmental 
response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CerCLA) all provide for an award of 
17 J. Mallor, B.S. roberts, Punitive Damages: On the Path to a Principled Approach?, 50 Hastings Law 
Journal 1001 (1999), p. 1003; Meurkens, supra note 15, pp. 20-21; U. Magnus, Punitive Damages and 
German Law, in: Meurkens et al., supra note 5, p. 251; de Kezel, supra note 5, pp. 225-226.
18 Meurkens, supra note 15, p. 22; Adar, supra note 16, pp. 301 and 347.
19 M. galanter, Shadow Play: The Fabled Menace of Punitive Damages, 1 Wisconsin Law review 1 
(1998), p. 14.
20 v.e. Schwartz, M.A. Behrens, J.P. Mastrosimone, Reining in Punitive Damages “Run Wild”: Proposals 
for Reform by Courts and Legislatures, 65 Brooklyn Law review 1003 (1999), p. 1004.
21 C. Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 Harvard Law review 1173 (1931), p. 1176; L.L. 
Schlueter, Punitive Damages – Volume 1, LexisNexis, Newark, New Jersey: 2005, p. 79.
22 r.L. Blatt, r.W. Hammesfahr, L.S. Nugent, Punitive Damages: A State-by-State Guide to Law and 
Practice, Thomson reuters/West, eagan, Minnesota: 2008, p. 40; D.g. Owen, Products Liability Law, 
Thomson/West, St. Paul, Minnesota: 2005, p. 1122.
23 Wisconsin Supreme Court, Luther v. Shaw, 147 N.W. 18 (1914), 20.
24 A.J. Sebok, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Theory of Common Law Punitive Damages, in: Meurkens et al., 
supra note 5, p. 133.
25 W. Schubert, Simplifying Punitive Damages: Due Process and the Pursuit of Manageable Awards and 
Procedures in U.S. Courts, 4 european Journal of Consumer Law 829 (2011), p. 832; A.J. Sebok, Punitive 
Damages in the United States, in: H. Koziol, v. Wilcox (eds.), Punitive Damages: Common Law and Civil 
Law Perspectives, Springer, vienna: 2009, p. 156.
26 Sebok, supra note 25, p. 156.
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treble damages (a form of multiple damages achieved by tripling the compensatory 
award).27 
Punitive damages are generally accepted in 45 states of the United States.28 In Con-
necticut punitive damages are only permitted to compensate the plaintiff for his legal 
expenses, less taxable costs.29 Five states have restricted levels of acceptance, varying 
from prohibition to conditional acceptance. New Hampshire has abolished the rem-
edy by statute,30 and the Constitution of Nebraska bars punitive damages awards.31 In 
the states of Louisiana (an island of Civil Law influenced by the surrounding ocean 
of Common Law32), Massachusetts and Washington a plaintiff cannot obtain puni-
tive damages unless there is specific statutory authorization.33 The availability of puni-
tive damages is in principle restricted to tort actions.34 In practice, however, American 
courts award punitive damages in a wide array of cases.35 The plaintiff in a contractual 
dispute may receive punitive damages if the defendant’s breach of contract constitutes 
an intentional tort as well.36 The Second restatement of Contracts states the principle 
clearly: “Punitive damages are not recoverable for a breach of contract unless the con-
duct constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable.”37 
Insurance bad faith cases, for instance, can lead to an award of punitive damages if the 
insurer’s breach of contract is so outrageous that it amounts to a breach of the duty of 
good faith and fair dealing which is implied in every insurance policy.38
Probably one of the most (in)famous punitive damages cases in the United States 
is that of Stella Liebeck v. McDonald’s.39 The plaintiff had been burned by hot coffee 
which she had purchased at a McDonald’s fast food restaurant. She suffered third- and 
27 The punitive portion of the award will thus amount to twice the compensatory damages.
28 Sebok, supra note 25, p. 155; Sebok, supra note 24, p. 134, fn 5.
29 Venturi v. Savit, Inc., 191 Conn. 588, 592, 468 Atlantic reporter, Second Series (A. 2d) 933, 935 
(1983) (citing Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477, 489, 234 A.2d 825, 832 (1967)); Kelsey 
v. Connecticut State Emp. Ass’n, 179 Conn. 606, 427 A.2d 420 (1980).
30 N.H. rev. Stat. Ann. § 507:16 (1997).
31 Distinctive Printing and Packaging Co. v. Cox, 232 Neb. 846, 857, 443 N. W. 2d 566, 574 (1989).
32 B. Janke, F.-X. Licari, Les conflits de lois en matière de dommages-intérêts punitifs. L’expérience de la 
Lousiane, 85 revue Lamy Droit des Affaires 132 (2013).
33 See e.g. Int’l Harvester Credit Corp. v. Seale, 518 So.2d 1039, 1041 (La. 1988); Dailey v. North Coast 
Life Ins. Co., 919 P.2d 589, 590–91 (Wash. 1996); Fleshner v. Technical Communications Corp., 575 N.e.2d 
1107, 1112 (Mass. 1991).
34 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 568, 569, 570; 25 C.J.S. Damages § 198, 199, 200.
35 Schlueter, supra note 21, p. 399; 25 C.J.S. Damages § 199.
36 W. Burnham, Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States (4th ed.), Thomson/West, 
St. Paul, Minnesota: 2006, p. 241.
37 Second restatement of Contracts, § 355 (1981).
38 H.r. Levine, Demonstrating and Preserving the Deterrent Effect of Punitive Damages in Insurance Bad 
Faith Actions, 13 University of San Francisco Law review 613 (1979), p. 618; J.M. Barrett, Contort: Tortious 
Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Noninsurance Commercial Contracts – Its 
Existence and Desirability, 60 Notre Dame Law review 510 (1985), p. 510 and fn 2 with the references 
therein.
39 Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., 1995 WL 360309 (N.M. Dist. 1994).
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fourth-degree burns (some all the way to the bone) in her pelvic region when she spilled 
the hot coffee on her lap. She initially spent eight days in hospital and her burns were so 
severe that she almost died. The victim demonstrated that McDonald’s had previously 
settled claims of victims with similar injuries from hot coffee, and that the company 
had never changed its policy of selling coffee at that temperature. The jury awarded 
the plaintiff USD 2.7 million in punitive damages (in addition to USD 160,000 in 
compensation). However, the amount of punitive damages was later reduced to USD 
480,000 (triple the compensatory damages) by the trial judge. This verdict was ap-
pealed, but before the appeal was decided the parties settled for an undisclosed and 
confidential amount.40
2. enForCeMent oF PunItIVe DAMAGes In tHe eu MeMBer 
stAtes: (InternAtIonAL) PuBLIC PoLICy exCePtIon
When an American court orders punitive damages against a defendant, such de-
fendant must pay the amount due to the plaintiff. If the defendant/debtor does not pay, 
the judgment can be enforced against his assets. When the debtor has no or insufficient 
assets in the jurisdiction where the judgment was rendered, enforcement can take place 
in a state or country where the judgment-debtor has assets. If the creditor wishes to 
seize european assets of the debtor, he will have to request exequatur of the judgment 
in the country or countries where the debtor holds assets. 
As has been noted, there is no treaty between the european Union and the United 
States with respect to the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments. Neither 
have individual Member States concluded bilateral or multilateral conventions with the 
United States in this respect. Hence the recognition and enforcement of US decisions 
in the examined eU Member States is governed by the respective countries’ national 
rules of private international law (understood as including civil procedure).
Compensatory damages awarded in the United States do not pose any special prob-
lems in terms of their enforcement in the european Union. Punitive damages granted 
by an American court are, however, a far more tricky issue given the divergent views 
on the exequatur of punitive damages between the different eU Member States. tradi-
tionally, the Member States have exhibited an attitude of distrust and even antipathy 
towards punitive damages. However, judicial decisions in Spain and France indicate an 
increasing openness toward this controversial remedy. 
The decision whether to grant or refuse enforcement of American awards of pu-
nitive damages boils down to a decision whether exequatur of the award would be 
compatible with the public policy of the requested forum. In all five selected Member 
40 For a collection of blog posts offering different unique insights into the case, see http://abnormaluse.
com/?s=liebeck (accessed 20 April 2016). There is also a 2011 documentary film entitled Hot Coffee (di-
rected by Susan Saladoff) which discusses the case.
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States a finding that enforcement is contrary to the state’s public policy constitutes 
grounds for refusal of such enforcement. All cases regarding the enforcement of US 
punitive damages in the eU Member States have been decided on the basis of these 
grounds, but with different outcomes.
At the outset it must be emphasised that the notion of public policy should be 
understood in the context of private international law. In private international law we 
deal with a more restricted form of public policy, namely international public policy.41 
A legal system is required to be more tolerant in cross-border matters than in purely 
domestic affairs.42 Despite its name, “international” public policy is a purely national 
concept.43 It contains the fundamental rules of domestic public policy that a legal sys-
tem wants respected in international cases.44 International cases thus trigger the more 
narrow concept of international public policy. This is the appropriate yardstick to be 
used when dealing with cases which are not purely domestic in nature. 
It is under the umbrella of this (international) public policy exception that the 
enforceability of foreign punitive damages is assessed and the objections against puni-
tive damages are formulated. This (international) public policy mechanism thus plays 
a pivotal role in the existing case law. Unfortunately, courts and scholars do not always 
distinguish between public policy and the narrower concept of (international) public 
policy. More often, they realise the existence of a division but, nevertheless, muddy 
the waters by employing the term public policy when referring to international public 
policy. This terminological confusion does not weaken the messages the national courts 
want to convey in their respective judgments.
3. tHe HostILe AttItuDe In GerMAny AnD ItALy
In the european Union several countries have rejected the enforcement of US 
punitive damages awards, based on the conservative view that such damages are, as 
a concept, a violation of the country’s (international) public policy. These jurisdictions 
include germany and Italy (see parts 3.1. and 3.2 below).
41 P. Mayer, v. Heuzé, Droit international privé, Montchrestien, Paris: 2004, p. 149, no. 205; A. Mills, 
The Confluence of Public and Private International Law: Justice, Pluralism and Subsidiarity in the International 
Constitutional Ordering of Private Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2009, pp. 275-277; 
A. Mills, The Dimensions of Public Policy in Private International Law, 4(2) Journal of Private International 
Law 201 (2008), p. 213; P. Bernard, H. Salem, Further Developments for Qualification of Foreign Judgments 
for Recognition and Enforcement in France: The test for punitive damage awards, International Bar Association 
(April 2011), p. 18.
42 B. Janke, F.-X. Licari, Enforcing Punitive Damage Awards in France after Fountaine Pajot, 60 The Ame-
rican Journal of Comparative Law 775 (2012), p. 792.
43 J. Dollinger, World Public Policy: Real International Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws, 17 texas 
International Law Journal 167 (1982), p. 170.
44 A.S. Sibon, Enforcing Punitive Damages Awards in France: Facing Proportionality within International 
Public Policy, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2382817 (accessed 15 March 2016).
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3.1. The German principled refusal 
The 1992 judgment of the Bundesgerichtshof in the case of John Doe v. Eckhard 
Schmitz epitomises the traditional european position of disapproval with respect to 
US punitive damages. The german Supreme Court clearly formulated the idea that 
punitive damages are contrary to germany’s (international) public policy and should 
thus be prohibited from entering the german legal order via a foreign judgment. It did, 
however, leave the door open for enforcement of punitive damages to the extent that 
they pursue a compensatory function.
3.1.1. The unenforceability of us punitive damages
The landmark case of John Doe v. Eckhard Schmitz originated in the state of Cali-
fornia. The plaintiff was a fourteen-year-old boy, a California resident, who had been 
the victim of sexual abuse. The defendant also lived in Stockton, California and had 
been sentenced in California to prison time for sexual misconduct. The victim sought 
to recover damages from the perpetrator. Before the case was tried in the civil court, the 
defendant/perpetrator, who was both an American and german citizen, fled to ger-
many, where he owned property. He did not appear in the civil case and left no property 
to seize in California. The California Superior Court (County of San Joaquin) found 
in favour of the victim and deemed the appropriate compensatory damages to be USD 
150,260 for past and future medical expenses and USD 200,000 for anxiety, pain and 
suffering. In addition to these compensatory damages, the perpetrator was ordered to 
pay USD 400,000 in punitive and exemplary damages. The California Court further 
ruled that 40% of the entire award represented the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees.45 Owing 
to the defendant’s lack of any assets in the US the victim had to enforce the judgment 
against the wrongdoer’s assets in germany. During these enforcement proceedings the 
question arose as to whether a decision containing a punitive award could be enforced 
on german territory.46 
The Bundesgerichtshof deviated from the lower courts’ rulings47 by accepting the 
compensatory damages, but rejecting the punitive damages awarded by the California 
Superior Court. In addressing the fate of the punitive award, the german Supreme 
45 California Superior Court (County of San Joaquin) 24 April 1985, John Doe v. Eckhard Schmitz, no. 
168-588, unpublished. The facts are to be found in the judgment of the Bundesgerichtshof: BgH 4 June 
1992, BGHZ 118, p. 312, NJW 1992, p. 3096, RIW 1993, p. 132, ZIP 1992, p. 1256 (english translation 
of the relevant parts of the judgment by g. Wegen, J. Sherer, Germany: Federal Court of Justice Decision 
Concerning the Recognition and Enforcement of U.S. Judgments Awarding Punitive Damages, 32 International 
Legal Materials 1320 (1993), p. 1329); J. Zekoll, The Enforceability of American Money Judgments Abroad: 
A Landmark Decision by the German Federal Court of Justice, 30 Columbia Journal of transnational Law 
641 (1992), p. 644; S. Baumgartner, How Well Do U.S. Judgments Fare in Europe?, 40 george Washington 
International Law review 173 (2009), p. 203.
46 M. tolani, U.S. Punitive Damages before German Courts: A Comparative Analysis with Respect to the 
Ordre Public, 17 Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law 185 (2011), p. 186.
47 Landgericht Düsseldorf 12 April 1990, 13 O 456/89, unpublished; Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf 
28 May 1991, RIW 1991, p. 594.
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Court stated that a foreign judgment awarding lump-sum punitive damages of a not 
inconsiderable amount in addition to the damages for material and immaterial losses 
generally cannot be enforced in germany.48 The judgment was thus declared enforce-
able for a total amount of USD 350,260.
The Court’s ruling is of particular interest because of its thorough and extensive 
explanation as to why US punitive damages trigger the public policy exception found 
in Art. 328(1)4 of the Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO) i.e. the german Civil Code of Pro-
cedure. The Supreme Court asserted that the german private law system provides for 
compensation for damage suffered but does not intend an enrichment of the victim.49 
The Bundesgerichtshof held that the legal principle of awarding the victim damages for 
the sole purpose of reimbursing what he has lost to be a fundamental principle of ger-
man law.50 Punishment and deterrence, the main objectives pursued by punitive dam-
ages, are aims of criminal law rather than of civil law. Punitive damages allow a plaintiff 
to act as a private public prosecutor. This interferes with the state’s monopoly on pe-
nalisation. Furthermore, the defendant cannot rely on the special procedural guarantees 
provided for in criminal law.51 
The Bundesgerichtshof did note the existence of a penal institution within german 
civil law. Contractual penalties provide for punishment under civil law.52 This find-
ing could have dismantled the civil/criminal distinction that the Court embraced and 
could have created an opening for punitive damages. However, contractual penalties 
originate from a legal agreement between parties. The german Supreme Court, there-
fore, found them to be irrelevant to the debate before it.53 
Finally, the Bundesgerichtshof formulated the argument that the enforcement of the 
punitive damages award should be denied because its enforcement in germany would 
put foreign creditors in a better position than domestic creditors. The former would be 
able to gain access to the assets of german debtors to a considerably greater extent than 
the latter, even if the latter had suffered more damage. The fact that foreign creditors can 
obtain punitive damages leads, according to the Court, to a lack of equal treatment.54, 55 
48 BgH 4 June 1992, NJW 1992, pp. 3102 and 3104; v. Behr, Punitive Damages in American and 
German Law: Tendencies Towards Approximation of Apparently Irreconcilable Concepts, 78 Chicago–Kent 
Law review 105 (2003), p. 158.
49 W. Kühn, Rico Claims in International Arbitration and their Recognition in Germany, 11 Journal of 
International Arbitration 37 (1994), p. 44.
50 v. Behr, Punitive Damages in Germany, 24 Journal of Law and Commerce (2005), p. 205.
51 BgH 4 June 1992, NJW 1992, p. 3103; tolani, supra note 46, p. 202; P.J. Nettesheim, H. Stahl, 
Recent Development: Bundesgerichtshof Rejects Enforcement of United States Punitive Damages Award, 28 texas 
International Law Journal 415 (1993), p. 419; N. Jansen, L. rademacher, Punitive Damages in Germany, 
in: Koziol & Wilcox, supra note 25, p. 76.
52 Art. 340-341 BgB (german Civil Code).
53 BgH 4 June 1992, NJW 1992, p. 3103.
54 Ibidem, p. 3104.
55 M. requejo Isidro, Punitive Damages from a Private International Law Perspective, in: Koziol & Wil-
cox, supra note 25, p. 246.
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It thus seems that the Bundesgerichtshof attempted to protect german industry from US 
litigation.56 The Court also highlighted the significant economic consequences on the 
insurance industry resulting from excessive punitive damages.57 
We can turn the reasoning of the Bundesgerichtshof around and look at the policy-
oriented argument from the point of view of an American competitor of the german 
judgment debtor. One can ask why the german debtor (who is active on the American 
territory) should be immune from liability for punitive damages incurred in the United 
States, whereas an American market competitor cannot escape this liability. Further-
more, the enforcement of American pain and suffering awards seems to be unproblem-
atic in germany, even if they are substantially larger than the amounts german courts 
would grant. The Court does not mention this scenario.58 
The Bundesgerichtshof also noted that the application of the public policy clause 
requires a strong link between the facts of the case and the forum where enforcement 
is sought.59 For the public policy exception to apply a connection between the case 
and the requested state is necessary. This connection is referred to as Inlandsbeziehung 
or Inlandsbezug. The weaker the connection, the less likely it is that the exception will 
apply and the more likely that enforcement will be granted.60 If the connection to 
the forum country is low, that country has less interest in closely policing its public 
policy.61 In John Doe v. Eckhard Schmitz, there was no close connection to germany. 
The crime was committed in the US. The young victim was a US citizen. The perpetra-
tor had dual citizenship but had moved to germany only after his conviction. Under 
these circumstances one would reasonably expect the public policy exception to be 
more restrained. Hence the rejection of punitive damages despite the slight connection 
of the case to the forum state indicates a strong german antipathy towards this type 
of damages.62
Although the determination that the punitive damages award was incompatible 
with german public policy sealed the fate of the punitive award, the Supreme Court, 
nevertheless, took its analysis one step further. It looked at the punitive award to assess 
whether it would pass the proportionality test.63 This principle gives german courts the 
responsibility to ensure that a damage award does not exceed the amount needed to 
compensate the injured party.64 The Court expressed its disapproval of sums of money 
56 S. Baumgartner, Understanding the Obstacles to the Recognition and Enforcement of U.S. Judgments 
Abroad, 45 New york University Journal of International Law and Politics (2013), p. 998.
57 BgH 4 June 1992, NJW 1992, 3104; Nettesheim & Stahl, supra note 51, p. 424.
58 P. Hay, The Recognition and Enforcement of American Money-Judgments in Germany: The 1992 Decision 
of the German Supreme Court, 40 The American Journal of Comparative Law 729 (1992), pp. 746-747, 
fn 72.
59 BgH 4 June 1992, BgHZ 118, p. 348.
60 requejo Isidro, supra note 55, pp. 245-246.
61 Baumgartner, supra note 45, p. 205, fn 189.
62 Nagy, supra note 8, p. 8.
63 BgH 4 June 1992, NJW 1992, p. 3104.
64 Nettesheim & Stahl, supra note 51, pp. 423-424.
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imposed on top of the compensation for damages, an approach which would leave no 
room for any amount of punitive damages. However, the Court found that enforce-
ment of the punitive damages award in the case before it would be excessive because the 
punitive damages awarded were higher in amount than the sum of all the compensatory 
damages.65 This statement may be interpreted such that the Bundesgerichtshof views a 1:1 
ratio between compensatory and punitive damages as the maximum allowed. In the 
case at hand this opinion was purely academic. However, the Bundesgerichtshof’s opin-
ion on proportionality could prove to be vital if the compatibility of punitive damages 
with (german) international public policy can be demonstrated. If the compatibility of 
the concept of punitive damages with international public policy would be accepted, 
the excessiveness check is the only obstacle remaining before the judgment can be 
enforced.66 This is the approach taken by the Spanish and French Supreme Courts (see 
infra part 4). The Bundesgerichtshof’s judgment gave no explicit indication as to the 
consequences of a finding of excessiveness for the enforcement of the non-excessive part 
of the punitive damages award, although it did mention that a court should not cut up 
the punitive award at its own unfettered discretion.67
3.1.2. exception for the compensatory part of the punitive award
The Bundesgerichtshof construed one exception to the unenforceability of punitive 
damages.68 It ruled that it would allow the enforcement of punitive damages if, and to 
the extent, that the punitive award serves a compensatory function. In the United States, 
punitive damages may occasionally serve as compensation for losses that are difficult to 
prove, for losses that are not covered by other types of damages, or as a means to deprive 
the defendant of the gains he or she acquired through his or her wrongful behaviour.69 
More importantly, the Court referred to legal costs which, under the US system, the 
prevailing party cannot, in principle, recoup from the losing party. It, however, refused 
to accept that one of the reasons for awarding punitive damages is invariably to shift the 
victorious party’s legal costs onto the losing party.70 The german Supreme Court, on the 
contrary, required that the foreign judgment clearly indicate the (partly) compensatory 
65 BgH 4 June 1992, NJW 1992, p. 3104.
66 In its decision the Bundesgerichtshof rejected punitive damages of “a not inconsiderable amount”. 
This is surprising because the amount should have been irrelevant to the german Supreme Court, given 
that the non-compensatory nature of the remedy alone was enough to refuse enforcement: Behr, supra note 
48, p. 159. This might indicate an opening for punitive damages after all.
67 BgH 4 June 1992, NJW 1992, p. 3104. 
68 Ibidem, p. 3103.
69 W. Wurmnest, Recognition and Enforcement of U.S. Money Judgments in Germany, 23(1) Berkeley 
Journal of International Law 175 (2005), pp. 196-197; Nater-Bass, supra note 2, p. 156; g. Wegen, 
J. Sherer, Recognition and Enforcement of US Punitive Damages Judgments in Germany: A Recent Decision 
of the German Federal Court of Justice, International Business Lawyer 485 (1993), p. 486; A.r. Fiebig, The 
Recognition and Enforcement of Punitive Damage Awards in Germany: Recent Developments, 22 georgia 
Journal of International & Comparative Law 635 (1992), p. 649.
70 BgH 4 June 1992, NJW 1992, p. 3103; Hay, supra note 58, p. 747.
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purpose of any punitive award.71 If the foreign court fails to do so, the german enforcing 
court cannot ascertain the motives behind the award, as this would run counter to the 
prohibition of révision au fond (i.e. a review of the merits of the judgment), laid down 
in section 723(1) ZPO. In the case at hand the Bundesgerichtshof did not find any 
reliable information in either the California judgment or in the transcript to support 
the argument that the punitive damages were intended to cover the legal costs incurred 
by the plaintiff. Although the American court had awarded 40% of the judgment to the 
plaintiff’s lawyer, the german Supreme Court argued that, since the 40% related to the 
entire judgment it could not exclude the possibility that the sums paid as compensatory 
damages – which the Bundesgerichtshof appeared to find generous – already included an 
element addressing those costs.72 The Bundesgerichtshof, therefore, did not deviate from 
its conclusion that the punitive award in its entirety should be rejected.73 
3.2. Italy’s complete unwillingness to enforce punitive damages
In Italy one can find a similar attitude of rejection and disdain for punitive dam-
ages as in germany. The seminal case on the enforcement of US punitive damages 
concerned a judgment coming from the state of Alabama. In 1985, a fifteen-year-old 
boy was involved in a traffic accident in the city of Opelika. A car failed to give way 
and hit the boy’s motorcycle, throwing him off the bike. The buckle of his helmet mal-
functioned and his unprotected head struck the pavement, resulting in instant death. 
The boy’s mother sued the driver, the American distributor of the helmet, as well as 
some additional defendants for the sum of USD 3 million before the District Court 
of Jefferson County in Alabama. Fimez SpA, the Italian manufacturer of the helmet, 
was later also brought into the proceedings. At trial all parties decided to settle for an 
undisclosed amount. Fimez SpA, however, had abandoned the case before this settle-
ment agreement. In a judgment of 14 September 1994 the District Court of Jefferson 
County in Alabama held the defendant liable for the negligent design of the defective 
crash helmet.74 The District Court awarded the victim’s mother USD 1 million in 
damages, without further specification.75
When the case reached Italy’s highest court in 2007, the Corte di Cassazione (the 
Italian Supreme Court) first explained that the classification of the USD 1 million dam-
ages depended on the facts of the individual case. This analysis is left to the Court of 
Appeal, whose factual finding cannot be reversed. The Court of Appeal of venice had 
held that the foreign judgment lacked a rationale, making it impossible to understand 
71 Zekoll, supra note 45, p. 657.
72 Nagy, supra note 8, p. 8.
73 BgH 4 June 1992, NJW 1992, p. 3104.
74 The District Court had already rendered the USD 1 million award in a non-final decision of 1 April 
1991 (or 1 January 1991 - the venice Court of Appeal’s judgment mentions both dates throughout its text). 
The judgment of 14 September 1994 confirmed the previous order, declared it final, and added reasons for it.
75 L. Ostoni, Italian Rejection of Punitive Damages in a U.S. Judgment, 24 Journal of Law and Commerce 
245 (2005), p. 246.
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the grounds on which the amount was awarded, the nature of the damages recovered, 
and the basis for the recovery of damages. It was, therefore, not able to establish and 
assess the criteria used by the Alabama Court to qualify the nature of the damages 
awarded and to quantify those damages. This led the venice Court of Appeal to the 
conclusion that the damages awarded were punitive in nature, even though the US 
Court did not expressly qualify them as such.76 
The Court of Appeal was probably not aware of the exact meaning of the Alabama 
wrongful death statute,77 which applied in this case.78 Historically, this rule has been 
interpreted to mean that the descendants or heirs are only allowed to recover punitive 
damages for wrongful death. Compensatory damages are not available. The Alabama Su-
preme Court, however, explained that the remedy serves multiple functions.79 It provides 
a “mere solatium to the wounded feelings of surviving relations, [or] compensation for 
the [lost] earnings of the slain”80 but it also aims “to prevent homicides”81 by making the 
amount of damages dependent on “the gravity of the wrong done”.82, 83 It was, therefore, 
clear that the award rendered against Fimez SpA pursued both a compensatory objective 
as well as its sanctioning and deterrence purposes.84 The venice Court did not consider 
this and instead seems to have based the penal classification of the judgment on the 
amount awarded.85 This judicial misconception, nevertheless, does not undermine the 
venice Court’s message as to the unacceptability of punitive damages. Besides, in light of 
the Alabama wrongful death statute, the American court would have probably classified 
the damages as punitive if it had decided to label the damages it awarded.
Although it could not have intervened even had it wished to, the Italian Supreme 
Court noted that the venice Court of Appeal’s finding of a violation of Italy’s public 
policy seemed justified in this case. The Italian Supreme Court is only entitled to reverse 
matters of law, such as a different definition of public policy. However, it did not find 
fault with the interpretation of public policy rendered by the venice Court.86 
76 Court of Appeal venice 15 October 2001, rep Foro it 2003, Delibazione no. 29; giur. It. II 2002, 
p. 1021; Ostoni, supra note 75, p. 249.
77 Alabama Code § 6-5-410 (1975).
78 F. Quarta, Foreign Punitive Damages Decisions and Class Actions in Italy, in: D. Fairgrieve, e. Lein 
(eds.), Extraterritoriality and Collective Redress, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2012, p. 276.
79 F. Quarta, Class Actions, Extra-Compensatory Damages, and Judicial Recognition in Europe, Conference 
paper – “extraterritoriality and Collective redress”, London 15 November 2010, Draft 19 November 
2010, p. 7.
80 Savannah & Memphis Railroad v. Shearer, 58 Ala. (1877), p. 680.
81 South & North Alabama Railroad v. Sullivan, 59 Ala. (1877), p. 278.
82 Estes Health Care Ctrs Inc v. Bannerman, 411 So2d (1982), p. 113.
83 Quarta, supra note 79, pp. 6-7.
84 Quarta, supra note 78, p. 276; Quarta, supra note 79, p. 7.
85 requejo Isidro, supra note 55, p. 248; Nagy, supra note 8, p. 7.
86 Cass. Civ. 19 January 2007, no. 1183, Rep Foro it 2007 v. Delibazione no. 13 and v. Danni Civili 
no. 316; Corr. Giur., 2007, 4, p. 497; F. Quarta, Recognition and Enforcement of U.S. Punitive Damages 
Awards in Continental Europe: The Italian Supreme Court’s Veto, 31 Hastings International & Comparative 
Law review 753 (2008), p. 757.
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The Italian Supreme Court further disagreed with the contention that the US deci-
sion did not violate public policy because the Italian liability system contains several 
legal institutions, such as penalty clauses and moral damages, which pursue punitive 
objectives.
It held that penalty clauses are not punitive in nature and do not have a retribu-
tive aim. They serve to strengthen a contractual relationship and quantify damages in 
advance. The Supreme Court noted that the amount of the contractual penalty can be 
reduced if the judge finds an abuse of the parties’ freedom of contract contrary to the 
principle of proportionality. It concluded that penalty clauses cannot be compared to 
punitive damages, despite the fact that the penalty is due without proof of the damage 
suffered or a strong correlation with the extent of the damage. Punitive damages, on 
the other hand, are an institution that is not only connected to the tortfeasor’s conduct 
and not to the damage suffered, but is also unjustifiably disproportional to the harm 
actually incurred.87 
The Court also rejected the suggested equivalence between punitive damages and 
moral damages. Moral damages reflect an actual loss suffered by the victim and recovery 
is based on that loss. Moral damages focus on the injured party, not on the wrong-
doer. The primary objective of moral damages is compensation, whereas in the case 
of punitive damages there is no relation between the damages awarded and the harm 
incurred.88 
According to the Italian Supreme Court, damages in private law are not connected 
to the idea of punishment or to the wrongdoer’s misconduct. Instead, the damages 
are intended to restore the damage suffered by the injured party by eliminating the 
consequences of the inflicted harm through the award of a sum of money. This is true 
for all types of civil damages, including moral damages, and they are not influenced by 
the victim’s conditions and the wrongdoer’s wealth, but require concrete and factual 
evidence of the loss suffered.89 In other words, Italy’s highest court made a clear distinc-
tion between compensatory and punitive damages, with absolutely no room for any 
overlap. Compensatory damages, including moral damages, focus on the victim, relate 
to his or her loss, and are intended to make him or her whole. Punitive damages, on 
the other hand, focus on the wrongdoer’s behaviour, are not connected to the damage 
suffered, and pursue the punishment of the tortfeasor. 
In sum, the Italian Supreme Court dismissed the analogy between penalty clauses 
and moral damages and punitive damages, as had the german Supreme Court in John 
Doe v. Eckhard Schmitz. It confirmed the view of the venice Court of Appeals that 
punitive damages are in violation of public policy and declined to enforce the Alabama 
USD 1 million award.90 As a result, the plaintiff was left without any compensation. 
87 Cass. Civ. 19 January 2007, no. 1183, Rep Foro it 2007 v. Delibazione no. 13 and v. Danni Civili no. 
316; Corr. Giur., 2007, 4, p. 497.
88 Ibidem.
89 Ibidem.
90 Ibidem.
tHe CUrreNt eUrOPeAN PerSPeCtIve... 249
Conversely, in view of the Court’s reasoning there should be no doubt about the en-
forcement of compensatory damages. As long as the compensatory damages are clearly 
distinguished from the punitive damages, their enforcement should not pose any public 
policy concerns.91
The Italian Supreme Court later affirmed its position in a judgment of 8 February 
2012.92 In this case it was confronted with a judgment coming from the Middlesex 
Superior Court in Massachusetts, USA. That court had ordered an Italian company 
to pay USD 8 million to an employee who had suffered injuries in an accident at the 
premises of the Italian corporation’s US subsidiary. The judgment did not mention 
punitive damages nor the criteria used to quantify the award. As in Fimez, the Italian 
courts were confronted with a global award without further specification or demarca-
tion. The Court of Appeal of turin declared the entire award enforceable because the 
judgment did not refer to punitive damages and the amount was reasonable and fair in 
light of the seriousness of the employee’s injuries. The Supreme Court, however, over-
turned the Court of Appeal’s decision. It yet again labelled the damages as punitive in 
nature despite the fact that the American judgment never discussed punitive damages. 
The Court reiterated that the Italian civil liability system is strictly compensatory and 
not punitive. The USD 8 million in damages awarded was thus found to be unenforce-
able on the basis of the public policy exception.93
4. More oPenness In sPAIn AnD FrAnCe
In both Spain and France (parts 4.1 and 4.2 below), the tolerance towards US puni-
tive damages seem to be much higher. The Supreme Courts of both nations have no 
objection to the concept per se. Instead of outright rejecting the institution itself, they 
focused on the amount of punitive damages awarded by the foreign (US) court. This 
more receptive stance increases the likelihood that the plaintiff will be able to enforce 
an American judgment containing punitive damages in its entirety against a defendant’s 
assets in Spain or France. 
4.1. spanish supreme Court embraces us punitive damages
In the case of Miller Import Corp. v. Alabastres Alfredo, S.L. of 13 November 2001, 
the Spanish Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo) issued its fiat approving a request for 
91 Nagy, supra note 8, p. 7.
92 Supreme Court, Soc Ruffinatti v. Oyola-Rosado, no. 1781/2012, 8 February 2012, Danno resp 2012, 
p. 609. 
93 LS Lexjus Sinacta, Italian Supreme Court Confirms Stance On Punitive Damages (21 December 2012), 
International Law Office, available at: http://www.intemationallawoffice.com; Italian Supreme Court Affirms 
Position Against Punitive Damage Awards (31 January 2013), available at: http://www.goldbergsegalla.com/
publication/italian-supreme-court-affirms-position-against-punitive-damage-awards (both accessed on 20 
April 2016); Quarta, supra note 78, p. 275, fn 32.
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enforcement of a US judgment containing punitive damages.94 At the time, requests 
for the enforcement of foreign judgments had to be brought directly before the civil 
division of the Spanish Supreme Court.95 The American litigation concerned an al-
leged infringement of intellectual property rights. The plaintiffs, Miller Import Corp. 
(domiciled in the US) and Florence S.r.L. (domiciled in Italy) claimed that defendant, 
Alabastres Alfredo, S.L. (domiciled in Spain) had manufactured falsified labels of their 
registered trademark in Spain. The Federal District Court for the Southern District of 
texas (Houston Hall) in Houston sided with the plaintiffs and awarded treble damages 
in a judgment of 21 August 1998.96 The defendant contended before the Spanish Su-
preme Court that, inter alia, enforcement should be declined on the basis of the public 
policy exception. 
In its decision on the request for enforcement the Tribunal Supremo held that the 
texas award contained some damages that did not serve a compensatory objective but 
were more punitive, sanction-like and preventive in nature. The Court classified com-
pensation for injuries as part of (Spanish) international public policy. However, it added 
that coercive, sanctioning mechanisms are not uncommon in various areas of Spanish 
substantive law, specifically contract law, and procedure. According to the Court, the 
presence of such punitive mechanisms in private law to compensate for the shortcom-
ings of criminal law is consistent with the doctrine of minimum intervention in penal 
law. This doctrine is embedded in the Spanish legal system and requires the legislature 
to first counter unwanted conduct by employing less invasive remedial intervention, 
such as civil penalties. Criminal penalties should only be used as ultimum remedium.97 
Furthermore, it is often difficult to differentiate concepts of compensation. The Court 
referred to the example of moral damages to make this point clear. Moral damages 
fulfil a compensatory role (the reparation of moral damage) as well as a sanctioning 
function, and it is not easy to distinguish between the two.98 Spanish law thus allows 
for a minimal degree of overlap between civil law (compensation) and criminal law 
(punishment).99 This was an opposite view to that taken by the Italian Supreme Court 
in Fimez (see supra part 3.2). In making its public policy analysis, the Spanish Court 
added that courts should not lose sight of the connection between the matter and the 
94 Spanish Supreme Court, exequatur no. 2039/1999, 13 November 2001, Aedipr 2003, p. 914.
95 F. ramos romeu, Litigation Under the Shadow of an Exequatur: The Spanish Recognition of U.S. Judg-
ments, 38(4) International Lawyer 945 (2004), p. 951; M. requejo Isidro, Punitive Damages: Europe Strikes 
Back?, presentation delivered at the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2 November 
2011, London; text on file with the author.
96 Federal District Court for the Southern District of texas (Houston Hall) of 21 August 1998, un-
published and archived. The judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court does not mention the amount of 
the treble damages.
97 Quarta, supra note 79, p. 10.
98 Nagy, supra note 8, p. 9.
99 S.r. Jablonski, Translation and Comment: Enforcing U.S. Punitive Damages Awards in Foreign Courts: 
A Recent Case in the Supreme Court of Spain, 24 Journal of Law and Commerce 225 (2004-2005), p. 229; 
Nagy, supra note 8, p. 9.
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forum. This is of course a reference to the theory of Inlandsbeziehung, which regulates 
the strength of the public policy exception according to the case’s proximity to the 
forum.100 All these reasons led the Court to the conclusion that punitive damages as 
a concept do not violate public policy.101 
The Tribunal Supremo went on to develop its reasoning further. The principle of 
proportionality was the second and final requirement of the public policy test which 
the award needed to meet before enforcement could be allowed. The Court took two 
elements into account when assessing the (potentially) excessive nature of the tre-
ble damages: (1) the predictability of the award; and (2) the nature of the interests 
protected.102
The Court first underlined the fact that the treble damages arose ex lege. The 
legal provisions providing sanctions for infringements of the intellectual property 
rights in question took into consideration the intentional character and gravity of the 
defendant’s behaviour when allowing for a tripling of the amount of compensatory 
damages. This reliance on the statutory origin of the punitive damages in issue begs 
the question whether punitive damages developed by case law would be predictable 
enough for the Spanish Supreme Court.103 In our opinion the absence of a statutory 
provision would not automatically rule out the enforcement of a punitive damages 
judgment.104 
US punitive damages awards can reach very high amounts. A 2005 survey of trials 
in state courts in the United States’ seventy-five most populous counties indicated that 
in 27% of cases in which punitive damages were awarded the amount granted exceeded 
USD 250,000. In 13% of the matters the award exceeded USD 1 million.105 One 
wonders what could happen to punitive awards coming from states where punitive 
damages legislation does not provide for caps.106 In most American states the only con-
straint on the amount of punitive damages comes from the courts, most notably from 
the US Supreme Court’s case law regarding due process. The Spanish Supreme Court 
confirmed that the U.S courts are prudent in policing the proportionality of dam-
ages awarded.107 Moreover, legality may lead to foreseeability, but it does not guarantee 
proportionality. even a legislative intervention to fix the amount of punitive damages 
(whether by establishing a maximum, a minimum, or an appropriate range) does not 
100 M. requejo Isidro, Punitive Damages: How Do They Look Like When Seen From Abroad?, in: Meur-
kens et al., supra note 5, pp. 326-327; requejo Isidro, supra note 55, p. 247.
101 Spanish Supreme Court, exequatur no. 2039/1999, p. 914.; M. Otero Crespo, Punitive Damages 
Under Spanish Law: A Subtle Recognition?, in: Meurkens et al., supra note 5, p. 289; requejo Isidro, supra 
note 55, pp. 247-248; requejo Isidro, supra note 100, p. 326.
102 requejo Isidro, supra note 100, pp. 327-328.
103 Ibidem, p. 328.
104 requejo Isidro, supra note 95.
105 t.H. Cohen, L. Langton, Civil Bench and Jury Trials in State Courts, 2005, Bureau of Justice Statistics 
(28 October 2008), p. 6.
106 requejo Isidro, supra note 95.
107 Spanish Supreme Court, exequatur no. 2039/1999, p. 914; Jablonski, supra note 99, p. 229.
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make the award proportional in all cases. Furthermore, the foreign country’s idea of 
proportionality may vary from the Spanish legislature’s estimation.108 
As to the second aspect of the proportionality criterion, the Court argued that the 
safeguarding of intellectual property rights in a market economy is important. More-
over, the interest in offering protection to such rights is not strictly local but is shared 
universally by countries that harbour similar judicial, social, and economic values.109 
The common desire to protect the interests at stake justified the awarding of an amount 
double the amount of compensatory damages on top of the compensation granted.110 
The importance of the underlying ratio legis will thus determine the outcome of the 
proportionality analysis.111 Other rights of high importance outside the field of intel-
lectual property could, for instance, include: environmental protection, protection of 
human rights, freedom, legal certainty and dignity.112
Commentators seem to agree that the Court’s acceptance of treble damages in this 
case does not mean that every punitive award will easily pass the public policy excep-
tion in Spain.113 Jablonski argues that the judgment should be interpreted narrowly. It 
should be seen as inspired by the specific facts of the case (and not, therefore, as laying 
down a general rule114).115 requejo Isidro also expresses doubt as to whether punitive 
damages awards will be enforced in future cases in Spain. She underscores the fact that 
there is only a single decision. Under Art. 1.6 of the Spanish Civil Code, case law con-
stitutes a source of law if the doctrine set is repeatedly upheld by the Supreme Court, 
which requires at least two judgments. She further argues that it was a coincidence that 
the applicable national jurisdictional rules at the time allowed the Supreme Court to 
rule on the case without any prior litigation at the lower levels.116 In France, on the 
other hand, the Fountaine Pajot case travelled through the pyramidal court system to 
reach the Supreme Court (see 4.2 below).117 In our opinion it does not matter how the 
Supreme Court came to rule on the case. Besides, as will be discussed in the next sec-
tion, the verdict of the Cour de cassation deviated from the two lower French courts. 
Whatever the case may be, the enforcement of the compensatory damages of a foreign 
judgment containing punitive damages should never be obstructed by the international 
public policy exception.118
108 requejo Isidro, supra note 95.
109 Spanish Supreme Court, exequatur no. 2039/1999, p. 914.
110 Jablonski, supra note 99, p. 230.
111 requejo Isidro, supra note 100, p. 328.
112 requejo Isidro, supra note 95.
113 Jablonski, supra note 99, pp. 227 and 230; requejo Isidro, supra note 95; ramos romeu, supra 
note 95, p. 968.
114 to the extent that the creation of rules is even possible for courts in Civil Law countries, given the 
absence of precedent.
115 Jablonski, supra note 99, p. 230.
116 requejo Isidro, supra note 95.
117 Ibidem.
118 ramos romeu, supra note 95, p. 968.
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4.2. Principled acceptance in France
The French Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation) indicated its willingness to accept 
foreign punitive damages awards in a judgment of 2010.119 Peter Schlenzka and Ju-
lie Langhorne, a couple from California, had purchased a 56-foot Marquises catama-
ran from rod gibbons’ Cruising Cats USA, an authorised dealer and agent for the 
French manufacturer, Fountaine Pajot S.A. The American buyers paid the sum of USD 
826,009. When the boat was delivered to the couple, they believed the catamaran to 
be in excellent condition. However, unbeknownst to the buyers the vessel had suffered 
extensive damage in a storm in the port of La rochelle, the place of its manufacturing. 
The seller had not disclosed this information to the buyers and had performed only su-
perficial repairs. The structural problems were, however, not resolved and the California 
couple soon experienced issues with the catamaran.120
On 26 February 2003 the California Superior Court (Alameda County) ruled in 
favour of the plaintiffs and awarded them USD 1,391,650.12 in actual damages. It fur-
ther held that Fountaine Pajot’s conduct in relation to the sale amounted to fraud under 
California law. It determined that an amount of USD 1,460,000 in punitive damages 
would be appropriate to punish and deter the French company without resulting in 
its financial ruin. The California Superior Court also applied a statutory exception to 
the general American rule on attorneys’ fees, which holds that each party shall bear 
their own costs, even if they are victorious in the law suit. On the basis of the federal 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,121 a prevailing consumer may recover reasonable legal 
costs. Schlenzka and Langhorne were thus awarded USD 402,084.33 in attorneys’ fees, 
bringing the total amount to USD 3,253,734.45.122
The American couple subsequently had to enforce the judgment in France, as Foun-
taine Pajot was located there. The matter eventually reached France’s Supreme Court, 
which for the first time had to take a stance on punitive damages. On 1 December 
2010 it ruled: “le principe d’une condemnation à des dommages interest punitifs, n’est 
pas, en soi, contraire à l’ordre public, il en est autrement lorsque le montant alloué est 
disproportionné au regard du préjudice subi et des manquements aux obligations con-
tractuelles du débiteur.” (“the principle of awarding punitive damages is not, in itself, 
contrary to public policy; although this is not the case when the amount awarded is 
disproportional to the loss suffered and to the contractual breach of the debtor”) (own 
translation).123 Thus according to the French Supreme Court, punitive damages are 
119 Cass. Civ. 1st, 1 December 2010, Schlenzka & Langhorne v. Fountaine Pajot S.A, no. 09-13303, 
recueil Dalloz 2011, p. 423.
120 The facts of the case are found in the judgment of the French district court of rochefort: tribunal 
de grande Instance rochefort, Peter Schlenzka & Julie Langhorne v. S.A. Fountaine Pajot, 12 November 
2004, no. 03/01276, unpublished decision.
121 15 USC 2310(d)(2).
122 California Superior Court, Schlenzka v. Pajot, case no. 837722-1, 26 February 2003; Janke & Licari, 
supra note 42, p. 782.
123 Schlenzka & Langhorne v. Fountaine Pajot S.A, p. 423. 
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not in and of themselves contrary to (international) public policy. Foreign punitive 
damages can, therefore, in principle be enforced in France. This revolutionary ruling 
makes it clear that objections against the enforcement of punitive damages based on 
the argument that they violate the divide between criminal and private law should be 
dismissed.124 This liberal, welcoming attitude on the part of France’s Supreme Court 
appears at first sight to be very progressive. 
However, the openness of the Cour de Cassation to punitive damages is by no 
means unbridled. The French Supreme Court attached an important caveat to the 
general rule it delineated. Punitive damages do violate international public policy 
when their amount is “disproportional to the damage suffered and the breach of the 
contractual obligations of the debtor” (own translation).125 In other words, although 
the concept of punitive damages conforms to France’s international public policy, 
the proportionality of the award is still a requirement of said policy.126 The centre of 
the public policy analysis shifts from the incompatibility of the concept of punitive 
damages itself to an investigation of their amount.127 The real obstacle for punitive 
damages under the (international) public policy test in France is no longer the dogma 
that they are not compensation, but rather the distinct issue of excessiveness. This 
corresponds to the attitude of the Spanish Supreme Court in Miller Import Corp. v. 
Alabastres Alfredo, S.L.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Fountaine Pajot did not offer concrete guidelines 
on how to determine whether a foreign punitive damages award is excessive. It merely 
provided that punitive damages should not be disproportionate in relation to the in-
jury suffered and the breach of the contractual obligations of the debtor.128 This lack of 
practical guidance leaves French judges, legal scholars and practitioners wondering at 
what point punitive damages become disproportional.129 As the determination of the 
proportional nature of the award lies in the discretion of the lower courts, the absence 
of a bright-line standard creates uncertainty.130
The judgment of the Cour de cassation can be read in two different ways. On the 
one hand, one could assert that the French Supreme Court required a comparison 
between the amount of punitive damages and the amount of compensatory dam-
ages awarded (or in the words of the Court “the injury suffered” (“préjudice subi”)). 
The Cour de cassation concluded in that regard that the punitive damages award-
ed too greatly exceeded the compensatory damages (the difference between them 
124 Licari, supra note 6, p. 425. 
125 Schlenzka & Langhorne v. Fountaine Pajot S.A, p. 423. 
126 Sibon, supra note 44.
127 Janke & Licari, supra note 42, pp. 794-795. 
128 Schlenzka & Langhorne v. Fountaine Pajot S.A, p. 423.
129 Bernard & Salem, supra note 41, p. 19; J. Juvénal, Dommages-intérêts punitifs. Comment ap-
précier la conformité à l’ordre public international?, 6 La Semaine Juridique edition générale (2011), 
p. 142.
130 Sibon, supra note 44.
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being USD 70,000).131 One may also wonder whether the attorneys’ fees should 
play a role in this mathematical exercise.132 This first method of explaining the judg-
ment leads to a 1:1 maximum ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, 
identical to the ceiling the german Supreme Court impliedly suggested 18 years 
earlier in John Doe v. Eckhard Schmitz (see supra part 3.1).133 Such a 1:1 ratio stands 
in sharp contrast with the single digit rule (i.e. a maximum ratio of 9:1) established 
by the US Supreme Court when setting limits to punitive awards in the US.134 Al-
though the California Superior Court in the case at hand respected the US Supreme 
Court’s delineation (the 9:1 ceiling), its exceeding of the 1:1 ratio, even though 
only by a few percentage points, proved fatal for the punitive award’s chances of 
enforcement.135 
On the other hand, one should bear in mind the Cour de Cassation’s reference in 
Fountaine Pajot to the defendant’s breach of contract (“des manquements aux obliga-
tions contractuelles du débiteur”).136 The Court presumably was referring to the serious 
nature of the defendant’s breach of contract.137 The Supreme Court is in principle 
bound by the description of the facts laid out by the Court of Appeal. The dispute 
about the catamaran arose from a contract between the parties. The French Supreme 
Court, therefore, moulded the language of its judgment according to the contractual 
origin of the litigation. We can, however, extrapolate the Cour de cassation’s statement 
to torts as well. This is in fact necessary since most punitive damages in the US origi-
nate in tort cases. Punitive damages in contract cases are possible only if the behaviour 
constituting the breach of contract is also a tort for which punitive damages are avail-
able.138 The notion “des manquements aux obligations contractuelles du débiteur” could 
perhaps be more generally read as the seriousness of the debtor’s wrongful behaviour, 
the degree of culpability or blameworthiness of the fault.139 The Court could actu-
ally have used this suggested terminology, notwithstanding the contractual origin of 
the litigation, because the punitive damages were probably more connected to Foun-
taine Pajot’s fraudulent and deceitful conduct surrounding the breach of contract (i.e. 
131 Schlenzka & Langhorne v. Fountaine Pajot S.A, p. 423; N. Meyer Fabre, Recognition and Enforcement 
of U.S. Judgments in France: Recent Developments, The International Dispute resolution News 6 (Spring 
2012), p. 9.
132 It could be argued that the amount awarded for attorneys’ fees (in casu USD 402,084.33) should 
be added to the compensatory damages when calculating the ratio. Legal costs are in essence also a form 
of loss caused by the defendant. Of course, this scenario is quite exceptional because US litigants almost 
always bear their own costs, even if they win the case.
133 N. Meyer Fabre, Enforcement of U.S. Punitive Damages Award in France: First Ruling of The French 
Court Of Cassation in X. v. Fountaine Pajot, December 1, 2010, 26(1) Mealey’s International Arbitration 
report 1 (January 2011), p. 4.
134 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell et al., 538 U.S. 425 (2003).
135 Janke & Licari, supra note 42, p. 801 and fn 113.
136 Bernard & Salem, supra note 41, p. 19; Nagy, supra note 8, p. 9.
137 Janke & Licari, supra note 42, p. 776.
138 Second restatement of Contracts, § 355 (1981).
139 Meyer Fabre, supra note 133, p. 4; Nagy, supra note 8, p. 9.
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tortuous actions) than to the actual breach itself (the non-conformity of the vessel to 
the contract).140 
This second interpretation of the judgment requires the defendant’s conduct to be 
taken into account when assessing the possible excessiveness of the foreign punitive 
damages awarded, along with the amount of compensatory damages given to the vic-
tim.141 In our view, this could mean that the enforcement judge can modulate the 1:1 
maximum ratio according to the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct. This ap-
proach, however, encounters a fundamental problem: it seems to allow an incursion 
into the forbidden révision au fond.142, 143 
Although the Cour de cassation touched upon the breach of contract as one of the 
two factors used to measure the proportionality of the punitive damages, it did not take 
the Fountaine Pajot’s conduct into account.144 It merely stated that the Court of Appeal 
could have rightfully concluded that the punitive award was manifestly disproportion-
ate because the punitive damages greatly exceeded the purchase price and the cost of 
the repairs. to make matters worse for the American plaintiffs, they had not requested 
enforcement of only the compensatory damages in the event the punitive damages were 
deemed unacceptable. The Cour de cassation, therefore, had to reject the entire Califor-
nia judgment as it could not grant partial enforcement. This prohibition on ultra petita 
rulings thus left the US plaintiffs empty-handed.
5. tHe MIxeD outLooK on PunItIVe DAMAGes  
In enGLAnD
england distinguishes itself from the other countries examined in this contribution 
because english law itself provides for “exemplary damages”, the english equivalent of 
“punitive damages” (part 5.1 below). Perhaps surprisingly, this fact does not mean that 
england is completely receptive to enforcing US punitive damages. Multiple dam-
ages cannot be enforced (part 5.2) and it is currently uncertain whether other forms 
of punitive damages will be accepted for enforcement purposes by english courts 
(part 5.3).
5.1. Availability of punitive damages in english substantive law
The roots of modern punitive damages can be found in england. The first statu-
tory recognition of multiple damages took place in 1275. The relevant provision in the 
140 Meyer Fabre, supra note 131, p. 9, fn 25.
141 Nagy, supra note 8, p. 9.
142 Cass. Civ. 1st, 7 January 1964, Munzer, Bull., I, no. 15.
143 various authors note that the proportionality test reintroduces a révision au fond: Bernard & Salem, 
supra note 41, p. 19; Juvénal, supra note 129, p. 142; Janke & Licari, supra note 42, pp. 801-802.
144 Meyer Fabre, supra note 133, p. 4.
tHe CUrreNt eUrOPeAN PerSPeCtIve... 257
Statute of Westminster read: “[t]respassers against religious persons shall yield double 
damages”.145 Between 1275 and 1763 Parliament enacted at least 64 other provisions 
for double, treble and quadruple damages.146 In 1763, in the case of Huckle v. Money, 
exemplary damages147 were first expressly recognised in england.148
In Rookes v. Barnard the House of Lords laid down three categories according to 
which punitive damages are available.149 Lord Devlin first suggested that it may well 
be thought that exemplary damages confuse the civil and criminal functions of the 
law.150 He, however, explained that: “[...] there are certain categories of cases in which 
an award of exemplary damages can serve a useful purpose in vindicating the strength 
of the law and thus affording a practical justification for admitting into the civil law 
a principle which ought logically to belong to the criminal.”151
The House of Lords, as per Lord Devlin, opined that oppressive, arbitrary or uncon-
stitutional behaviours or actions by the servants of the government could warrant puni-
tive damages. It was held that: “[...] the servants of the government are also the servants 
of the people and the use of their power must always be subordinate to their duty of 
service”. Lord Devlin clarified that oppressive conduct by private persons or entities 
does not fall into this category.152 Most cases under this category involve misconduct 
by police officers.153
The second category encompasses cases in which the defendant calculated his behav-
iour in order to make a profit which may exceed the compensation payable to the vic-
tim. Lord Devlin explained that the law should demonstrate that it cannot be broken 
with impunity, i.e. whenever a defendant calculates that the money generated from the 
wrongdoing will probably exceed the damages at risk. In essence, punitive damages 
under this category teach the wrongdoer that wrongful tort actions do not pay.154 The 
most notable examples under this category are cases in which a landlord unlawfully 
evicts a tenant. Defamation cases form the second largest group of cases which could 
lead to punitive damages under this heading.155 
145 Synopsis of Statute of Westminster I, 3 edw., c. 1 (eng.), quoted in: D.g. Owen, Punitive Damages 
Overview Functions: Problems and Reform, 39 villanova Law review 363 (1994), p. 368.
146 r. Fowler, Why Punitive Damages Should Be a Jury’s Decision in Kansas: A Historical Perspective, 52 
Kansas Law review 631 (2004), p. 636.
147 The case can also be seen as the beginning of the english courts’ use of the term “exemplary dam-
ages” for damages awarded above the level of compensation and with the purpose of deterring and pun-
ishing the defendant: J.B. Sales, K.B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic that Has Outlived Its Origins, 
37 vanderbilt Law review 1117 (1984), pp. 1119-1120.
148 Huckle v. Money, 95 english reports, King’s Bench (eng. rep.) 768 (K.B. 1763).
149 Rookes v. Barnard, pp. 37-38.
150 Ibidem, p. 34.
151 Ibidem, p. 37.
152 Ibidem.
153 v. Wilcox, Punitive Damages in England, in: Koziol & Wilcox, supra note 25, p. 11.
154 Rookes v. Barnard, pp. 37-38.
155 Wilcox, supra note 153, p. 12; t. Ingman, The English Legal Process (13th ed.), Oxford University 
Press, Oxford: 2010, p. 326.
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In addition to the two common law categories, Lord Devlin constructed a third 
category, i.e. punitive damages expressly provided for by statute.156
5.2. Absolute prohibition to enforce multiple damages 
The Protection of trading Interest Act (PtIA) is a statute from 1980 which prohibits 
the enforcement of multiple damages in england. PtIA attempts to thwart the exercise 
of US extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign citizens.157 The United States has always 
emphasised the need for and legality of enforcing its antitrust laws against parties that 
lack a connection to the US territory, but whose actions nevertheless have an effect in 
the US. The British government, on the other hand, has believed that these antitrust 
laws should only apply to the promulgating nation’s own territory or citizens.158 This 
disagreement could not be solved by diplomatic means, and legal warfare ensued.159
As part thereof, the British government enacted PtIA, which provides that a judg-
ment of an overseas country cannot be registered and no court in the UK may entertain 
proceedings at common law for the recovery of any sum payable under such a judg-
ment, if that judgment grants multiple damages (sections 5.1 and 5.2). The rule incor-
porates the belief that the treble damages which are recoverable under US antitrust law 
are penal in nature and should not be available to private plaintiffs acting as private at-
torneys general.160 Section 5 aims to neutralise the treble damages incentive for private 
parties in US legislation, because it forces private litigants to weigh the benefits and 
costs of such an action given their unenforceability in the UK.161 Although intended to 
apply to multiple damages (treble damages) arising out of antitrust litigation, a literal 
reading of the Act prohibits the enforcement of any type of multiple damages, irrespec-
tive of the underlying cause of action.162 
Section 5 of PtIA not only prevents the enforcement of the additional damages but 
deems the basic compensatory element of a multiple damages award unenforceable as 
well. This follows from a textual interpretation of the Act, and the scholars Dicey and 
Morris support this literal reading of the Act, arguing that that: “[j]udgments caught by 
section 5 are wholly unenforceable, and not merely as regards that part of the judgment 
which exceeds the damages actually suffered by the judgment creditor”.163 Judge Parker 
(and Lord Diplock later agreed on his point164) remarked in the case of British Airways 
156 Rookes v. Barnard, p. 38.
157 t.J. Kahn, The Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980: Britain’s Response to U.S. Extraterritorial 
Antitrust Enforcement, 2(2) Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 476 (1980), p. 479.
158 Kahn, supra note 157, p. 514.
159 J. Fawcett, J.M. Carruthers, Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private International Law (14th ed.), Oxford 
University Press, Oxford: 2008, p. 561.
160 Kahn, supra note 157, p. 489.
161 Ibidem, p. 510, 513 and 515.
162 Ibidem, p. 510.
163 L. Collins (ed.), Dicey & Morris on the Conflict of Laws (13th ed.), Sweet and Maxwell, London: 
2000, p. 566.
164 British Airways v. Laker Airways [1985] AC 58, p. 89.
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v. Laker Airways that section 5 of PtIA is aimed at judgments in antitrust matters and 
affects the whole award, not just the multiple damages part of it.165, 166
5.3. Are other forms of punitive damages enforceable?
Punitive damages which are not created by a multiplication of the compensatory 
damages are outside the scope of PtIA, and thus a different regime is applied to them. 
It is well settled in england that an english court will not lend its assistance to the en-
forcement of a foreign penal law.167 An imposition of a penalty constitutes an exercise 
by a State of its sovereign power. Such an act of sovereignty cannot have any effect in 
the territory of another nation.168 english courts will, therefore, refuse to enforce a for-
eign judgment when it is given in respect of a fine or penalty. However, a sum payable 
to a private individual is not a fine or penalty.169 The crucial criterion for determining 
whether a foreign measure is a penalty thus appears to be the receiver of the sums. If the 
money goes to a foreign state, the sum has to be classified as penal (and unenforceable).
This formalistic approach was confirmed in S.A Consortium General Textiles v. Sun 
and Sand Agencies Ltd.,170 the only case incidentally dealing with the issue of the en-
forceability of punitive damages. A French company had sold clothing to english mer-
chants, but after delivery the buyers failed to pay the agreed price. The seller brought 
its payment claim before the Commercial Court of Lille. In addition, it sought a fur-
ther 10.000 francs as “résistance abusive”,171 a type of damages awarded in France when 
a defendant has unjustifiably opposed the plaintiff’s claim. Since the defendants did 
not appear in court, the Commercial Court of Lille issued a default judgment for the 
plaintiffs for the amount claimed, interest and costs. enforcement of the judgment in 
england was at the time governed by the Foreign Judgments (reciprocal enforcement) 
Act 1933, which regulated enforcement for judgments originating in countries with 
which the UK had a mutual recognition treaty. The defendants attempted to prevent 
the enforcement of the 10,000 francs (awarded as a result of the unreasonable refusal 
by the defendants to pay a plain claim) in england on the grounds that the French 
judgment imposed a penalty. Under section 1(2)(b) of the Act, sums payable in respect 
of a penalty were excluded from enforcement. The defendants further relied on sec-
tion 4(1)(a)(v), which stated that enforcement should be denied when it would violate 
the public policy of the requested state. As to the nature of the sum for the “abusive 
résistance”, all three judges in the Court of Appeal agreed that the amount for the un-
165 British Airways v. Laker Airways [1984] QB 142, p. 161.
166 e. Kellman, Enforcement of Judgments and Blocking Statutes: Lewis v. Eliades, 53 International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 1025 (2004), p. 1028.
167 See e.g. Folliott v. Ogden [1790] 3 term rep, p. 726; Huntington v. Attrill [1893] AC, 150, Raulin 
v. Fisher [1911] 2 KB, p. 93.
168 Fawcett & Carruthers, supra note 159, p. 126.
169 M. Polonsky, Particular Issues Affecting the Recognition and Enforcement of U.S. Judgments, 19 Interna-
tional Law Practicum 156 (2006).
170 S.A Consortium General Textiles v. Sun and Sand Agencies Ltd. [1978] Q.B., p. 279.
171 Art. 1153 of French Civil Code. 
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reasonable withholding of sums under a valid claim was compensatory, not penal in 
nature, and therefore enforceable in england. Lord Denning saw the sum as compensa-
tion for losses not covered by an award of interest, such as loss of business caused by 
want of cash flow, or for costs of the proceedings not covered by the court’s order for 
costs. He, however, expanded obiter dictum upon the issue and summarised the defend-
ants’ argument as sustaining that the 10,000 francs were punitive or exemplary damages 
which amounted to a penalty and were therefore unenforceable under section 1(2)(b) 
of the 1933 Act.172 He repeated the conventional idea that a fine or other penalty only 
referred to sums payable to the state by way of punishment, and that a sum payable to 
a private individual was not a fine or penalty.173
Lord Denning’s statements in dicta relating to punitive damages provide insight 
given the hybrid nature of punitive damages. Punitive damages seek to punish the 
wrongdoer for reprehensible conduct. However, they are not payable to the treasury but 
to the victim of the blameworthy behaviour. Lord Denning’s remarks seem to explicitly 
support the view that, despite their inherent criminal nature, for enforcement purposes 
in england punitive damages can avoid the penal label if they are awarded to a private 
person instead of to a state.174 Lord Denning further ruled that english public policy 
does not oppose the enforcement of a claim for punitive damages, because they are “still 
considered to be in conformity with the public policy in the United States and many 
of the great countries of the Commonwealth.”175 He thereby indicated that punitive 
damages do not pose a problem under england’s (international) public policy either.176 
However, the obiter dictum character of his elaboration should be emphasised, leading 
to the conclusion that, at the very least, the enforceability of punitive damages in eng-
land has not yet been definitively settled.
ConCLusIons
Despite being under constant criticism, punitive damages have a strong foothold on 
the other side of the ocean. As the extra-compensatory function of punitive damages 
has no equivalent institution or official existence in the european Union, the remedy is 
one of the characteristics of the American legal system which exemplifies the “Atlantic 
divide”177 between Civil Law and Common Law jurisdictions. The only major excep-
tion to the express rejection of punitive damages in the european Union can be found 
172 The other judges in the case, goff L.J. and Shaw L.J., did not refer to the notion “punitive damages”.
173 S.A Consortium General Textiles v. Sun and Sand Agencies Ltd. [1978] Q.B., pp. 299-300.
174 Collins, supra note 163, p. 476.
175 S.A Consortium General Textiles v. Sun and Sand Agencies Ltd., p. 300.
176 The Supreme Court of Australia (Full Court) and the British Columbia Court of Appeal reached the 
same conclusion: Benefit Strategies Group Inc v. Prider [2005] SASC, p. 194 and Old North State Brewing 
Co v. Newlands Services Inc. [1999] 4 WWr, p. 573.
177 de Kezel, supra note 5, p. 214. 
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in england, the nation of their modern birthplace,178 which provides for an acknowl-
edgment of “exemplary damages” in limited circumstances.179
given the absence of international treaties on the subject, the domestic law of each 
Member State determines the enforceability of American punitive damages awards. In 
general, the outcome of a request for enforcement of a US punitive award depends on 
how the Member State construes its own (international) public policy exception. Our 
analysis shows that several countries within the european Union have adopted diver-
gent stances on the issue.
The Supreme Courts in Italy and germany have rejected punitive damages awards 
in enforcement proceedings, arguing that the concept itself violates international public 
policy. In 1992, in the case of John Doe v. Eckhard Schmitz, the Bundesgerichtshof stated 
that US punitive damages awards cannot be enforced in the german territory. The 
german Supreme Court referred to various arguments underlying this decision. It un-
derlined the compensatory function of german private law and noted that enrichment 
of the plaintiff is prohibited. The german Supreme Court further held that punish-
ment and deterrence are objectives that belong to the realm of criminal law. Punitive 
damages interfere with the state’s monopoly on penalisation because a private person 
acts as a public prosecutor. In addition, in such civil cases the defendant cannot rely 
on the fundamental guarantees that are available to him in criminal law proceedings. 
The Bundesgerichtshof also rejected the parallel between penalty clauses and punitive 
damages.
In 2007, in Glebosky v. Fimez the Italian Corte di Cassazione refused to accept that 
Italian private law contains any punitive considerations. It also found that penalty 
clauses and moral damages are not comparable to punitive damages. Five years later it 
reiterated this position by stating that the Italian civil liability rules pursue only com-
pensatory, and not punitive, aims.
The odds of recovering a US punitive damages award in Italy or germany are, there-
fore, close to zero. In germany, however, the compensatory part of a punitive damages 
award will be granted enforcement provided this compensatory portion is clearly indi-
cated in the American judgment. The Italian Supreme Court did not contemplate this 
option.
France and Spain, on the other hand, have accepted the compatibility of punitive 
damages with their international public policy. The Spanish Tribunal Supremo was the 
first european Supreme Court to allow the enforcement of punitive damages, in the 
case of Miller v. Alabastres in 2001. It acknowledged the existence of punitive elements 
in Spanish private law. The presence of these punitive mechanisms demonstrates that 
Spanish civil law sometimes concerns itself with punishment in addition to compensa-
tion. Punitive damages as a legal concept could not be viewed as a violation of Spain’s 
178 J.y. gotanda, Punitive Damages: A Comparative Analysis, 42 Columbia Journal of transnational Law 
391 (2004), p. 398.
179 Rookes v. Barnard, pp. 37-38.
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international public policy. About a decade later the French Supreme Court in Schlenka 
& Langhorne v. Fountaine Pajot reached the same conclusion. 
Both the Spanish and the French Supreme Courts subsequently shifted their atten-
tion to an investigation of the amount awarded by the foreign court. Although puni-
tive damages as such are digestible to the Spanish and French Civil Law stomachs,180 
excessive punitive damages are problematic in light of their international public policy 
exceptions. In France, the Cour de cassation seems to have limited its tolerance of puni-
tive damages to an amount equal to the compensatory damages granted, although it is 
unclear to what extent the blameworthiness of the defendant’s conduct can be taken 
into account. In Spain the level of acceptance is much higher, as the Tribunal Supremo 
allowed the enforcement of an American treble damages judgment. It put forward two 
criteria to assess the excessiveness of the award: (1) the predictability of the award; and 
(2) the nature of the interests protected. How Spanish and French (lower) courts will 
shape the excessiveness assessment in future cases remains to be seen and is difficult to 
predict.
england offers a mixed outlook on the enforcement of a third state’s punitive dam-
ages award. Multiple damages, a subcategory of punitive damages, are statutorily barred 
by PtIA. In addition, the presence of a multiple element taints the entire award, ren-
dering the compensatory part unenforceable as well. Whether other forms of punitive 
damages can survive the english courts’ scrutiny seems to be uncertain. Foreign fines 
or penalties are not enforceable in england. However, Lord Denning’s obiter dictum 
in S.A. Consortium General Textiles v. Sun and Sand Agencies Ltd. argued that punitive 
damages cannot be equated to a fine or a penalty if they awarded not to a state but to 
a private actor. Furthermore, according to Lord Denning, english public policy does 
not oppose punitive damages awards. Further case law is, however, needed to confirm 
whether this welcoming attitude will become law.
180 Nagy, supra note 8, p. 7.
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